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VOLUME 27 FEBRUARY, 1952 NUMBER 1
GIFTS TO MINOR CHILDREN-GUARDIANSHIPS VS.
INTER VIVOS TRUSTS-IS THE KJECKHEFER
TRUST THE ANSWER?
WILLARD J. WRIGHT*
MIucH comment' has followed the recent decision of the Court ofI Appeals for the 7th Circuit in Kieckhefer v. Commissioner,2
with some encouragement for persons contemplating gifts in trust for
minor children. The spectacular nature of the trust instrument in this
case and the outspoken refusal of the Tax Court to accept the type of
trust involved,' at least for tax purposes, furnishes an occasion to
reconsider the relative merits of a trust and a guardianship as a recep-
tacle for gifts for the benefit of minor children. While the donor of
gifts to minor children has had a difficult time escaping tax liability in
recent years in the income and death tax field, these liabilities have
become "relatively" crystallized. The judicial analysis of the Kieck-
hefer "trust" focuses attention upon the problems of the trust donor
in the gift tax field. Its provisions reflect an attempt of the donor to
avoid liability not only for income, estate, and inheritance taxes, but
also for gift tax by taking advantage of the annual exclusion provisions
of the law.
Tax trends and court decisions over the past five or six years have
been responsible for some of the oddest trust provisions. This is true to
such an extent that one wonders whether the obvious strain to satiate
*J.D., University of Washington, 1939; member of the Washington Bar.
1 Armand Drexler, The Exclusion Provision of the Gift Tax Law Nreeds Amending,
,-29 TAxEs, 743 (1951) ; Austin Fleming, Gifts For the Benefit of Minors, 79 MicH. L.
REv. 529 (1951) and Gifts to Minors, 37 A. B. A. J. 78 (1951) ; Dwight Rogers, Out-
right Gifts to Minors and the Gift Tax Exclusion, 7 TAx L. REv. 84 (1951).
2189 F. 2d 118 (C.C.A. 7th 1951).
3 Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 111 (1950) ; Willis D. Wood v. Commis-
sioner, 16 T.C. No. 118 (1951); Stifel v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. No. 71 (1951); John
E. Daniels v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. 147 (1951).
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exacting tax interpretations is not defeating its purpose.' Thus, in the
Kieckhejer case a grandfather was induced to transfer certain prop-
erty to a trustee for his minor grandson, aged two months. The trust
instrument had the usual protective provisions for the benefit of the
minor child and the usual broad trust powers invested in the trustee,
but it also contained this unusual clause:
13. This trust has been created by the donor after full consideration and
advice. Upon such consideration and advice the donor has determined that
this said trust shall not contain any right in the donor to alter, amend,
revoke or terminate it. The beneiciary shall be entitled to all or any part
of the trust estate or to terminate the trust estate in whole or in part at any
time whenever said (minor) or the legally appointed guardian for his
estate shall make due demand therefor by instrument in wtriting filed with
the then trustee, and upon such demand being received by the trustee, the
trustee shall pay said trust estate and its accumulation or the part thereof
for which demand is made over to said (minor) or to the legally appointed
guardian for his estate who made such demand on his behalf.
Why should anyone take such pains to draw a trust instrument with
all of the usual trust powers and provisions and then give his two-
month-old beneficiary the exclusive unchallengeable right to terminate
the trust estate and devour for his own purposes all or any part of the
trust corpus and income? From time immemorial the primary function
of such a trust instrument was to protect the beneficiary from himself,
his immaturity, inexperience, or incompetence. It also provided a
method of freeing the estate administration from the ordinary shackles
of the law governing guardianships by granting broad powers of invest-
ment and management to an inter vivos trustee. For centuries con-
siderable advantages have been found in the trust device over a legal
guardianship. Yet here is a "thoughtful" grandparent providing at the
end of his trust that if his two-month-old grandson demands in writing
that the trustee turn over all of the estate to him, the trustee is com-
pelled to do so. Why didn't the grandfather put the entire estate di-
rectly in the hands of the grandson or of a legal guardian? Perhaps
the answer lies in the fact that so long as the minor or his guardian
does not exercise his power, all of the usual advantages of a trust over
a guardianship can be enjoyed.
4Drexler, 29 TAXES, at page 748: "It might be asked why taxpayers have gone to
such lengths to obtain a tax benefit which by its very nature is likely to save little, if
any, tax. The answer lies partly in the fact that taxpayers have become so tax con-
scious in recent years that they often react favorably to almost any legitimate tax
savings plan without full consideration of other consequences. This is especially true
where the other consequences lie in a field with which they are generally not likely to
be familiar, such as the field of trusts and guardianships."
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ADVANTAGES OF TRUSTS OVER GuARumNSmr s
In the state of Washington these advantages are considerable insofar
as the management and control of the trust estate are concerned. The
trustee, given the written authority,' may exercise the broadest power
over the management of the trust estate, while the legal guardian is
subject always to "the general direction and control" of the Superior
Court controlling his appointment.' The guardian must obtain court
approval of every sale of both real and personal property,7 while the
trustee may keep his own counsel in the sale or disposition of any por-
tion of the trust estate. The guardian is not allowed to use either income
or principal from the estate for his ward's support and education with-
out first obtaining court approval, and unless the parents of the ward
are unable to maintain and educate him." The trustee could, in a trust
instrument so providing, rely solely upon his own discretion in the
application of both income or principal of the trust estate. Generally
the right of the guardian to enter contracts even with court approval is
so limited in some cases that if the contract proves to be detrimental to
the estate, any loss incurred will be charged against the guardian per-
sonally.'
a Under Washington law, if the trustee's powers are not expressly granted in the
trust instrument his powers generally are reduced to no more than are currently
enjoyed by a legal guardian in the state of Washington. RE.,. REv. STAT. § 11548- to
11548-28 (1941 Supp.) require the trustee unless excused by the trust instrument pro-
vision, to file reports and accounts each year, an inventory of the estate, file distribution
accounts, vouchers, and a final account. He must also file notice of appointment and a
copy of the trust instrument, including a list of the names, addresses and dates of
birth of beneficiaries, etc. In contrast, a legal guardian must file a report and account
only every two years. RE- REv. STAT. § 1575 (3).
a REm. REv. STAT. §§ 1572, 1575.
7REmx. REV. STAT. § 1582. The guardian must apply to and obtain the approval of
the Superior Court whenever he desires to sell or transfer any assets of the guardian-
ship estate. The sale of any property of the guardianship estate requires court approval
"where... it is necessary to sell ... any of the real or personal property of the estate
of the ward for the purpose of paying debts or for the care, support, and education of
such ward... -or for the purpose of making any investments or for any other purpose
which to the court may seem right and proper."8 REm. REV. STAT. § 1575 (6). "When any ward has no father or mother or such
father or mother is unable or fails to educate such ward, it shall be the duty of his
guardian to provide for him such education as the amount of his estate may justify."
In re King, 151 Wash. 121, 275 Pac. 82 (1929), where the Court said at page 124:
"Where the guardian is also the parent of the infant ward, he will not be permitted to
sell the ward's real estate for such purposes unless it is clearly shown that he is unable
to support and educate him"; In re Rohne, 157 Wash. 62, 288 Pac. 269 (1930), where
the Court observed at page 72: "It is the law that in proper cases minor wards may be
supported from their own estate where it is shown that the parents have not the requi-
site ability to support the wards in a position and station commensurate with the ward's
expectations and station in life... ." Confirmed and cited with approval in Goodwin v.
American Surety Company, 190 Wash. 457, 68 P. 2d 619 (1937).
9 25 AM. JLm 64.
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Investment powers of the trustee prior to 1951 were vastly superior
to those of a legal guardian in Washington." In 1951, however, the
state Legislature removed existing doubts as to the applicability of the
Prudent Man Investment Rule to the investment of guardianship
funds." Although a written trust agreement may provide for unlimited
powers of investment in a trustee, this appears to be of slight, if any,
advantage over the Prudent Man investment power.
A trustee is not required to furnish a bond, but until 1951 all
guardians were required to do so. Under another 1951 amendment to
the Washington law 2 any bank or trust company authorized to act as
guardian may do so without bond. Likewise, certain individual guard-
ians are exempted in limited estates which are invested in special
ways, but in all other cases the legal guardian is required to furnish
a bond to be fixed by the court.'
ADVANTAGES OF GUARDIANSHIPS OVER TRUSTS IN THE TAX FIELD
In general, therefore, the advantages of a trust over a guardianship
for administration purposes cannot be challenged. However, state and
10 Under the former Washington law considerable doubt existed as to the precise
obligation of the guardian as to investments. Jiskra Estate, 108 Wash. 187, 182 Pac.
961 (1919) ; Carlson's Guardianship, 162 Wash. 20, 297 Pac. 764 (1931) ; King v. Sells,
193 Wash. 294, 75 P. 2d 130 (1938) ; LeFevre Estate, 9 Wn. 2d 145, 113 P. 2d 1014
(1941); and in any case, the statute required court approval. (REm. REv. STAT.
§ 1582). In 1943 considerable confusion ensued from the act passed by the Legislature
(REm. REv. STAT. § 1583-1, 1943 Supp.) specifically restricting investments by guar-
dians to "such bonds, securities, or other choses in action as are made by law, legal
investments for trust funds by corporations doing a trust business or mutual savings
banks doing business under the laws of the State of Washington.... ." At the same time
the law (REm. REv. STAT. § 3255-1 et seq., 1941 Supp.) listed only very specific invest-
ments such as special Government obligations, first mortgages on real estate, public
utility obligations and certain limited industrial bonds. No corporate stocks could be
considered. The same limitations applied to mutual savings banks. (REm. REv. STAT.
§ 3324 et seq.) In 1947 some endeavor was made by the Legislature to broaden trustees'
rights to invest under.the Prudent Man rule (REM. REv. STAT. § 3325-10a et seq., 1947
Supp.), but it was considered very doubtful that the definition of "fiduciary" under
that statute actually included a guardian.
"1 Wash. Laws Regular Sess. 1951, ch. 218 § 1 provides that a "guardian of any
estate is a fiduciary within the meaning of the Prudent Man Investment rule" set forth
in REm. RLv. STAT. § 3255-10b (1947 Supp.), which in part provides that a guardian
may invest guardianship funds in "every kind of property, real, personal or mixed, and
every kind of investment, specifically including, but not by way of limitation, deben-
tures and other corporate obligations and stocks, preferred or common, which men of
prudence, discretion and intelligence acquire for their own account."
"2 Wash. Laws Regular Sess. 1951, ch. 242. This same provision of the law also
eliminates the necessity for a bond in special cases where the assets of the ward's estate
do not exceed the sum of $5,000, and where certain special treatment is accorded such
assets.
is REM. REV. STAT. § 1573 requires a guardian to furnish "bond with sureties to be
approved by the court."
In such a situation frequently a guardian would not be able to obtain satisfactory
bond without agreeing to joint control of the guardianship estate by the bonding com-
pany, which would possibly double the inconvenience of the guardianship administra-
tion and frequently make it very difficult.
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federal tax legislation and court decisions have in recent years taxed
the "trust donor" as to income, gift, and estate and inheritance taxes
in situations where the same donor, had.he made his gift outright to a
legal guardian for the minor child, would not have been taxed at all.
These tax trends have gradually reduced the advantages of a trust over
a guardianship to a point where the trust has become so expensive (and
sometimes disastrously so) and so out of proportion to the incidental
expenses and inconveniences of administration of a legal guardian-
ship as to constitute -almost complete discouragement to the donor
against the use of a trust. Accordingly, what the trustor was endeavor-
ing to do in the "Kieckhefer trust" was to rid himself of all possible
controls over or interests in the trust property and to give all powers
and rights to the infant so that no tax liability might be imputed to
the trustor, yet still protect the infant with the advantages of broad
managerial freedom and discretion of an inter vivos trustee.
A. INcoma TAx
In the trust field many donors painfully discovered after it was too
late that they were liable for taxes in a bracket superimposed upon
their own against income which they believed they had given to an
inter vivos trust for minor children. The income tax liability of a donor
making gifts to a trust for minor children is fairly well established
under case and statutory law, and although there are still some dis-
turbing factors, it was not in this particular category that the Kieck-
hefer problems lay. Mr. Kieckhefer's trust was drawn so that there
might not be any income tax liability. There was no possibility of the
trust estate revesting in the donor which would tax the income to him.14
He did not retain any controls which, under the Clifford doctrine,"
would tax income to him, and the trust income was not to be used to
14 INT. REv. CODE § 166: "Where at any time the power to revest in the Grantor
title to any part of the corpus of the trust is vested in (1) the Grantor, either alone or
in conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the distri-
bution of such part of the corpus or the income therefrom; or (2) in any person not
having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the corpus or the
income therefrom; then the income of such a part of the trust shall be included in
computing the net income of the Grantor."
25 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1939). The Court said at page 792: "Where
the head of the household has income in excess of normal needs it may well make but
little difference to him (except income-tax-wise) where portions of that income are
routed-so long as it stays in the family group. In those circumstances the all impor-
tant factor might be retention by him of control over the principal. With that control
in his hands he would keep direct command over all that he needed to remain in sub-
stantially the same financial situation as before." See also Cushman v. Commissioner,
153 F. 2d 510 (C.C.A. 2d 1946).
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discharge any of the donor's legal obligations or for any other benefits
of the donor which, under the Internal Revenue Code, would tax such
income to him."6
These laws make it particularly difficult for parents to use the trust
device for the benefit of their minor children, since any provision that
the income may be used for the education or support or maintenance
of the children did, prior to 1949, render all of the trust income taxable
to the parent donor.'7 This has been changed by an amendment to the
code section taxing to the parent donor only the amount of the trust
income actually used for this purpose.'
Such a situation would not occur under a legal guardianship device.
Any income received by the legal guardian which was devoted to the
education, care, or support of the minor child would not be taxable to
the parent donor.
It is generally recognized that the income from an estate which is
given by the donor to a guardian of the minor beneficiary rather than
to a trust is not taxable to the donor.' The case of Herberts v. Com-
missioner" furnishes a vivid contrast for income tax purposes of the
effect of a guardianship and a trust where a father had made various
gifts to or for the benefit of his children. Several were outright or held
by him as a "guardian," and others were made in trust for their benefit.
16 INT. REv. CODE § 167: "(a) Where any part of the income of the trust (1) is, or
in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having a substantial adverse inter-
est in the disposition of such part of the income, may be held or accumulated for future
distribution to the grantor; or (2) may, in the discretion of the grantor . . . be dis-
tributed to the grantor . . . then such part of the income of the trust shall be included
in computing the net income of the grantor."
1 Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942), in which a father created a written
trust for the benefit of his children naming himself, his wife and his brother as trustees,
with power to devote so much of the net income as "to them shall seem advisable" to
the education, support and maintenance of the minor beneficiaries.
Is INT. Ray. CODE § 167(c) : "Income of a trust shall not be considered taxable to
the grantor under subsection (a) or any other provision of this chapter merely because
such income, in the discretion of another person, the trustee, or the grantor acting as
trustee or co-trustee may be applied or distributed for the support or maintenance of a
beneficiary whom the grantor is legally obligated to support or maintain except to the
extent that such income is so applied or distributed."
1 Heller v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 1020 (1940); Miller Trust v. Commissioner,
7 T.C. 1245 (1946), where the issue involved taxation on income to the donor if there
were a trust, but not if there were a legal or natural guardianship. The Court stated at
page 1249: "Although in strict contemplation of law it may have been more proper for
them to apply for appointment as legal guardians to manage the estate of the children,
their desire to avoid the expense and complication of such a procedure is understand-
able. As a practical matter, it is certainly not unusual for parents to manage the prop-
erty and attend to the affairs of their minor children without such formalities." This
case affords ample warning that it would probably be better to have a legal guardian-
ship and avoid any of the tax problems which naturally ensue from some less formal
arrangement. The same problem was, discussed in Pettus v. Commissioner, 45
B.T.A. 855.
20 10 T.C. 1053 (1948).
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The Tax Court relieved the donor father from any income tax liability
on the outright gifts, over which, however, he exercised "the rights of
a natural guardian," and yet taxed the father on the income of the
other gifts which he held in a trust capacity.
The donor thus found one of the "advantages" of a legal guardian-
ship was the general indication of the courts that he would not be taxed
on the income of the gift corpus if he gave it to a guardian for the minor
child. Even though the guardian may use the income for the education
and support of the child of the donor, no tax would ensue to the donor,
and the fact that the donor as a parent of the child might find the
corpus revesting in himself in the event of the child's death again
would not tax the income to him under the provisions of Int. Rev.
Code § 166.
It is submitted that the real test as to the proper taxability of the
donor in these so-called family trusts should not be whether there has
been a trust or legal guardianship, but whether or not the gift for the
benefit of the children of the donor has been completed and the donor
has in fact divested himself of all incidents of title. This was brought
out in the recent case of Visintainer v. Commissioner,2 where the court
said: "The test to be applied in a case of this kind (gifts from one
member of the family to another which have the effect of reducing
taxes) is whether good faith, bona fide gifts were made to the children,
or the device was resorted to as a sham for evading income tax."
Certainly no question can be raised but that Mr. Kieckhefer divested
himself of all the necessary controls and incidents of ownership in his
trust so as to avoid any question of income tax liability.
The language in the Kieckhefer case and in other similar cases
dearly puts the donor beyond the reach of the income tax collector.22
21187 F. 2d 519 (C.C.A. 10, 1951).
22 Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, supra; Strekalovsky v. Delaney, 78 F. Supp. 556
* (1948) : "To pay any part or parts of his or her share(s) to him or her ... as if the
interest of each said child were held by the Trustee herein as guardian for said child
and as if the trustee were making payments and distributions in that capacity, for the
benefit of each child respectively"; and in Cannon v. Robertson, 98 F. Supp. 331 (June
25, 1951) where the trustees were to pay all of the income to the minor and were
instructed to "pay over to or use and apply for the support, maintenance, education and
pleasures of the said (minor) from time to time such amounts of the principal of the
property held in trust hereunder as may be approved and directed by the court.. ."
Stifel v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 71 (October 10, 1951): "The trustee during the
minority of settlor's daughter, may make payment of income or principal applicable to
the use of the settlor's said daughter by paying the same to her mother, guardian, or
other person having the care and control of such daughter ... as if the interest of




The trustor's problems in the death tax field are likewise fairly well
defined, but require the same care in draftsmanship as in the income
tax field. In the state of Washington any carelessness in this regard is
doubly penalized, since the State Inheritance Tax statute" is as broad
in scope as the federal estate tax provision.2" This death tax liability
can be devastating, as was found in the Estate of Speigel v. Commis-
sioner" where a grandfather had set up a trust for the benefit of his
children and grandchildren and had not intended that any portion of
the trust estate would revert to him. Under an interpretation of Illinois
law there was a very remote possibility that the trust corpus would
revert to him. This possibility had a value on the actuarial tables of
$4,000. On his death the Commissioner and the United States Supreme
Court found that the entire trust estate should be added to his estate,
which resulted in an additional tax of $450,000! Although this unfair
result was corrected by subsequent legislation," the damage had been
done. Donors must be prepared for such decisions of the courts. It
would not have happened if the donor had made his gift "outright" to
the guardians of the minor children, but again he might then have
sacrificed his desired result either of distribution or of management.
In the recent case of Townsend v. Thompson" a father gave certain
property to himself as trustee for his minor sons with power to expend
the trust income "for the education and maintenance of said beneficiary
while a minor." After the father's death the District Court taxed the
trust estate held for the minor son entirely in the estate of the father
donor under Int. Rev. Code § 811(c). Retention by the donor of the
right to use the income to the "discharge of a legal obligation of the
decedent or otherwise for his primary benefit" was such right to enjoy-
ment of the income as to tax the entire trust estate to the father. While
this decision may be distinguished under the federal law on the ground
that the father donor was also the trustee, the Washington statute car-
ries a much broader interest in that it applies to property passing to
"any person in trust."28
23 REM. REv. STAT. § 11201 (1949 Supp.).
24 INT. REv. CODE § 811(c).
25 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
26 INT. REv. CODE § 811 (c) (Under § 7a of the Technical Changes Act of 1949).
27 Townsend v. Thompson, 50-2 U.S. TAX CASES § 10780, Dist. Court Ark., 1950.
This decision cites § 811 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code which provides for the
inclusion as a part of a decedent's statutory gross estate all property transferred to
the decedent in trust or otherwise "under which he has retained for his life . . . the
possession or enjoyment of or his right to the income from property."2 8 REM. REV. STAT. § 11201 provides that there must be included in a decedent's
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Again, in the death tax field, the test appears to be whether or not
the incidents of ownership -were completely transferred by the donor
to the donee. In the legal guardianship situation there would be no
question. In the trust situation such questions naturally arise, depend-
ing upon the provisions of the trust instrument. These rules are fairly
well settled and generally understood in the tax field, and again, the
Kieckhefer trust provisions were so drawn as to avoid the incidence of
these taxes to the donor.
C. GIFT TAXES
Having the benefit of previous settled cases in the income and death
tax field, Mr. Kieckhefer's course- was well charted. But in the gift tax
field his trust device was pioneering. In this field of the tax law, both
federal and state, the situation is in complete flux. Here the federal
Tax Court openly opposes the decisions of other federal courts, and
nothing but well considered legislation or the ultimate determination
by the respective state and federal Supreme Courts can eventually
settle the problems. This is caused by the provision, identical in both
Washington State29 and federal law,"0 allowing an exclusion from gift
tax up to $3,000 per year per donee. To the Washington practitioner,
therefore, the decisions of the federal courts construing this law are
of moment on the local, as well as the federal level.
Anyone may make a gift without tax and even without having to
make a gift tax return if the value of the gift does not exceed (under
current law) the sum of $3,000. This exclusion applies to each gift to
any number of donees. Thus, if the donor gave to five donees, he could
give up to a total of $15,000 each year in $3000 shares to each donee
without tax. So in any estate planning for one's child or children, con-
sideration must be accorded these provisions.
The "joker" in this salutary exclusion provision is immediately
estate for inheritance tax purposes "all property ...which shall pass .. . to any
person in trust or otherwise ... under which the grantor or donor has retained for
his life ... the possession or enjoyment of any part of the property or the right to all
or any part of the income from the property...2 9 REM. REv. STAT. § 11218-14(b) : "(b) In the case of gifts, other than of future
interests in property, made to any person by the donor during any calendar year, the
first three thousand dollars ($3,000) of such gifts to such persons or body politic or
corporate shall not, for the purpose of this Act, be included in the total amount of gifts
made during such year."
3o INT. REv. CODE § 1003 (b) (3). "In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future
interests in property) made to any person by the donor during the calendar year 1943
and subsequent calendar years, the first $3,000.00 of such gifts to such person shall not,
for the purposes of subsection (a), be included in the total amount of gifts made during
such year."
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question, but has recognized its existence."
Thus, where the trust provides for the immediate and complete
distribution of all the trust income to the beneficiaries, it does not
necessarily follow that the entire gift is one of a present interest. As
in the decision of the Supreme Court in the Disston case, and as
discussed briefly by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in the Sharp case,
the courts have eventually evolved another hurdle for Mr. Taxpayer
to negotiate. It is said that a trust gift consists of two parts, income
and principal. If all income goes to the minor beneficiary, that part of
the gift is a present interest, and entitled to exclusion under the gift
tax act, but if the principal is not distributable to the minor immedi-
ately, then that portion of the gift is a future interest, and the donor
is not entitled to an exclusion as to that part."
However, if the parent donor is too generous and provides in his
trust agreement that the trustee shall pay not only all income to the
minor children, but also portions of the principal, then the courts deny
any exclusion to the donor on the ground that it can't be evaluatedl
Court held that under these provisions the trustee had no right to withhold the income
of the trust estate. The provision that the income would be accumulated was a reserve
measure to make some provision for any excess income. The federal Court of Appeals
thus states the rule at page 165: "If the income of the trust is to be accumulated and
paid over with the corpus of the trust at a future date, the entire gift is one of future
interest. Whenever the provision is made for immediate application of the funds for
the minor's benefit, whether of income or of corpus, the exemption applies. The fund
became available to the beneficiary here for his maintenance immediately upon con-
summation of the gift. He had at once the right of enjoyment. The present value of the
right to receive from the income of the trust estate was stipulated to be in excess of
$5,000.00." (The amount of the then statutory gift tax exclusion.) The proper con-
struction of this decision appears to the writer to be that if the value of the right to
immediate use and enjoyment of the income is in excess of the statutory exclusion the
entire exclusion will be allowed. It does not hold as has been construed elsewhere that
if the beneficiary is entitled to the immediate use of the income the entire gift of
income and principal is entitled to the gift tax exclusion.
39 Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18. The Court observed: "Finally it is urged
that unless these gifts are to be taken as conferring the right to immediate enjoyment,
no gift for the benefit of a child of tender years can be so regarded since in any such
case 'some competent person must be the primary judge as to the necessity and extent
of reasonable requirements of the beneficiary.' The argument is appealing insofar as it
seeks to avoid imputing to Congress the intention to 'penalize gifts to minors merely
because the legal disability of their years precludes them for a time from receiving
their income in hand currently'-but we think it is not applicable in the facts of this
case.... ." The Court had previously observed in this case as follows: "The statute in
this respect purports to make no distinction between gifts to minors and gifts to adults.
If there is deferment in either case the exemption is denied. Consequently in this case
the donors' laudable desire to make provision for their grandchildren in case of future
need cannot nullify the deferment which the recited absence of present need, coupled
with the terms of the trust, brought about."
40 Again, one of the leading cases on this subject is in the 9th Circuit, Fisher v.
Commissioner, 132 F. 2d 383 (C.C.A. 9th, 1942). Mrs. Fisher created a trust for her
six grandchildren. The trustee was to distribute all of the income in equal shares
directly to such of the grandchildren as were over twenty-one, and to the parents of
those who were not. The principal was to be held for distribution when the grand-
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In 1949 the Kniep" case laid down this rule which was followed by
the Tax Court in Evans v. Commissioner"2 in 1951. The courts admit
that the right to encroach upon the corpus when coupled with the
immediate right to income is considerably larger than the mere right to
income. Still the courts deny any part of the statutory gift tax exclusion
on the sole ground that valuation is either too difficult or impossible.
On the other hand, it is held that if a parent makes the gift to the
guardian of the minor child, there is no question but that the exclusion
may be applied. "
children attained certain ages from time to time. The Board of Tax Appeals held the
gift of income to be one of a present interest and the gift of corpus to be one of a future
interest. In a thorough analysis of the cases decided to that date our Court of Appeals
affirmed the Board of Tax Appeals decision saying, "The Taxpayer's assertion that
there could be only one gift to each beneficiary and that that gift could not at the same
time be both a present interest and a future interest in property, is erroneous. Whether
each beneficiary is considered as having received one gift or two, there can be no doubt
but that under the terms of the trust agreement each was given two distinct kinds of
interests." The Court cites the case of Charles v. Hassett, 43 F. Supp. 432 (D.C. Mass.,
1942), which very clearly expounds the anamoly of this double property interest in one
gift, at page 434. "Historically, lawyers have treated gifts of income beginning at once
and lasting for life or for a period of years as a 'present interest,' and gifts of principal
at a future date as a 'future interest'; Congressional committees and the Treasury
appear to have had some such distinction in mind; ... this and other Circuits in con-
struing the gift tax statute have used that line of distinction in cases where the gifts of
income and of principal were to different persons. Commissioner v. Brandegee (C.C.A.
1), 123 F. 2d 58; Welch v. Paine (C.C.A. 1), 120 F. 2d 141; Helvering v. Rubinstein
(C.C.A. 8), 124 F. 2d 969; Commissioner v. Taylor (C.C.A. 3), 122 F. 2d 714. See
2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GwT TAX § 15.11, 976, 977. No historical reason justifies
abandoning the distinction in cases where the gifts of income and of principal are to the
same person and are therefore regarded by donor and donee as one gift."
4 "Kniep v. Commissioner, 172 F. 2d 755 (C.C.A. 8th, 1949) which held that trusts
wherein all income was payable to the beneficiaries when they reached the age of
sixty-five but where the trustee was also authorized to encroach upon the principal of
the trust estate for the benefit of any beneficiary, the Court, though admitting the
present interest nature of the gift of the income, did not permit any exclusion from gift
tax for the reason that the taxpayer was not able to prove the amount of the value of
the present interest, the Court presupposing that the right of the trustee to encroach
upon the corpus reduced in equal measure the value of the present interest of the right
to receive income.
4217"T.C. No. 24 (1951). The Tax -Court of the United States citing the Kniep
decision. for authority in a decision rendered in August of 1951, denied any exclusion
to the donor taxpayer in the Es)ans case, where the trustee was to pay all of the income
to the taxpayer's children, even though minors, and "in addition; such sum or sums
from principal as in the uncontrolled discretion of the corporate trustee shall be neces-
sary for the education, comfort and support of such children .... " Each child was also
given the right after the age of thirty years to withdraw principal amounts not in
excess of $1,000 in any one calendar year. The Court denied the right to the exclusion,
saying, "Our problem is to value the present interest of each beneficiary, the right of
each to trust income as of the time of the gifts." As the Court of Appeals said in the
Kniep case, "The only certainty as of the time of the gifts is that the beneficiary will
receive trust income from the corpus reduced annually by the maximum extent -per-
mitted under the trust agreement. As we have said above, the trust agreement here per:
mitted total exhaustion of trust corpus. Accordingly, the present interests here were
incapable of valuation and we hold that the respondent Commissioner was correct in
his disallowance of the claimed exclusions." -4 3 Strekalovsky v. Deldney, 78 F. Supp. 556. (D.C. Mass. 1948) where the Court
said at page 558: "Had she, instead of making the gifts by trust, made them to the
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So the persevering donor, still wanting the benefits (so hard to come
by) of a written trust agreement, and still demanding freedom from
any tax consequences, conceived the remarkable product reflected in
the Kieckhefer, Cannon, Strekalovsky, and Stifel" cases.
The Commissioner and the Tax Court have stoutly maintained that
any gift of corpus in trust for a beneficiary is a gift of future interest.
In Jessie Phillips" the court observed: "The mere fact that the distri-
bution of the corpus is postponed is enough to make the gift a gift of
a future interest.""
The majority opinion in the Tax Court decision of the Kieckhefer
case ruled in essence that the minor beneficiary has not the capacity
to "presently enjoy" income or principal, and hence the postponement
by legal fiction makes the gift one of a future interest. 7
Other federal tribunals, however, have recently injected new hope
for Mr. Taxpayer and take a more practical view of the nature of the
beneficiaries' rights over trust principal. The Court of Appeals for the
7th Circuit in reversing the Tax Court in Kieckkefer v. Commissioner"
held that not only the gift of income to the trust, but also the gift of
the corpus, constituted a present interest, and the entire gift qualified
for the exclusion under the Act.
Mr. Kieckhefer's attorney argued that since the child or his legal
guardian could demand all or any part of the trust, and could terminate
the trust at any time, there was no "postponement of enjoyment of its
trust corpus"; that the minor had the right to obtain at any moment
the full use and enjoyment of the corpus, and thus the entire gift,
though in trust, was of a present interest.
The Commissioner argued that the enjoyment or use of the corpus
was necessarily postponed because (1) the infant beneficiary, being of
tender years, could not make an effective demand, and (2) the minor
had no legally appointed guardian at the time of the execution of the
trust or since its establishment.
guardians of the children, there could be no question but that the exemption would
apply."
4 Supra, note 22.
4512 T.C. 216 (1949).
46 Id. at 221. See also Willis D. Wood v. Commissioner 16 T.C. § 118, May 4, 1951.
47 Nor can the minor be saved under the Tax Court theory by a legal or a natural
guardian. The Tax Court said at page 116: "Even where a gift is made directly to the
fathers of minor donees, and as the guardians of such donees without the intervention
of a petition in court for the appointment of a legal guardian, it does not necessarily
follow that the gift is a gift of a present interest." Citing Schumacher, 8 T.C. 453,
which sustains this fiction that "Gifts to minor children made directly to their fathers
as guardians were gifts of future interests."
48 189 F. 2d 118 (1951).
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The Court observed that "the Commissioner's reasoning reduces to
a myth his concession that 'gifts to minor beneficiaries are placed on
an equality with gifts to adults.'" It requires that the "beneficiary
must have the actual, physical use, possession or enjoyment of the
property, in other words, that the beneficiary occupies the same posi-
tion relative to the gift that a boy sustains to his top or a girl to her
doll."
"It is not, however, the use, possession or enjoyment by the bene-
ficiary which marks the dividing line between a present and future
interest, but it is the right conferred upon the beneficiary to such use,
possession or enjoyment." (Italics supplied) ". . . the fallaciousness
of the Commissioner's contention is the failure to distinguish between
restrictions and contingencies imposed by the donor (in the case of
the trust instrument) and such restrictions and contingencies as are
due to disabilities always incident to and associated with minors and
other incompetents."
The Court in a 2 to 1 decision reversed the Commissioner and the
Tax Court, and granted Mr. Kieckhefer the right of the annual gift
tax exclusion to the principal held in trust.
Following the Kieckhefer decision, the federal District Court of
North Carolina in Cannon v. Robertson49 held to be a present interest
both income and principal given in trust for a minor where the trustee
was directed to use so much of the principal for the minor "as may be
approved and directed by the court vested with jurisdiction of the
person and estate of the said" minor.
This appears to put more "discretion in the trustee than was actually
contemplated in the Kieckhefer decision. It is submitted that if the
Kieckhefer doctrine is right at all, its correctness rests upon the right
of the minor or his legal guardian to demand the corpus, whereas in
the Cannon case the trustee has no legal compulsion to deliver the
corpus unless he in his discretion elects to do so.
But though some district courts will follow or even go farther than
the Kieckhefer case, it seems certain that the Tax Court will simply
refuse to recognize it.
There is no question but that the U. S. Tax Court will not approve
the application of the federal gift tax exclusion law to gifts in trust as
set out in the Kieckhefer case. In the most recent case of Stifel v.
Commissioner0 decided October 10, 1951, a father. created trusts for
49 98 F. Supp. 351 (D.C. N. Car., 1951).
s0 Stifel v. Comminsioner, 17 T.C. No. 71.
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his three minor children and made gifts to the trust, of which a bank
was named trustee. The income was to be applied for the benefit of the
minors during their lives. On the death of any minor beneficiary, the
accumulated income and principal, if any, were to be paid to the
administrators or executors of the respective minors' estates. As in the
Kieckhefer case, the trust instrument contained the usual provisions
and trust powers and again included the unusual provision in Article
11 to the effect that "the settlor's daughter shall have the right . . .
at any time to terminate this trust, either in whole or in part, and
during minority to demand payment of all or any part of any unex-
pended income in which event such part or all of the principal of the
trust or any accumulated income of the trust as to which the trust is
so terminated or such part or all of the income so demanded, as the
case may be shall be paid over to the settlor's said daughter, or if she
be a minor, to her general guardian or to such special guardian, but in
no event to the settlor." The Tax Court, despite its previous reversal
by the Circuit Court, ruled that a gift through this type of trust was a
gift of a future interest, and that the donor was not entitled to the gift
tax exclusion, saying: "The petitioner not only knew there was no
guardian in existence or in contemplation, but also that there was no
present reason for or likelihood of the exercise of any right to terminate
the trust or demand income as it might later accumulate. He must
have anticipated that there would necessarily be a substantial lapse of
time before any occasion to terminate the trust or to demand the
accumulated income would arise .... If the reversal in the Kieckhefer
case is in point, then with all due respect, we decline to follow it."51
Three of the judges on the Tax Court dissented from this opinion. The
majority decision cites the Fondren and Disston decisions which ruled
that an interest is a future interest if the donee does not have the right
to immediate use, possession and enjoyment. The decision in the Stifel
case seems to inject an additional requirement in that although the
donee may have the right to immediate possession, it is still a future
interest if any time is required to exercise the right!
Viewing the problem as objectively as a parent can, it would seem
that "future interest" should be redefined either by the Supreme Court
51 It is to be noted here that in Stifel v. Commissioner the Tax Court was sitting
in the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit. The Kieckhefer
decision was rendered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. Therefore, if
Mr. Stifel chooses to appeal the Tax Court decision and the 2nd Circuit Court affirms
the Tax Court, a direct issue between the two Courts of Appeal having coordinate
jurisdiction will be joined. This may force the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the issue.
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or by new legislation. 2 Surely if one takes literally the language of
the regulations as approved in the Fondren and Disston decisions "any
postponement of the right" to enjoy could be practically any slight
delay. The Tax Court in Stifel seems to imply, if not decide, that a
mere act of demanding the corpus by the minor or the unnecessary
delay in appointing a guardian for the minor who could not otherwise
demand was a postponement enough to create a future interest. Again
even in the case of a legal guardianship, the rule in the Fondren case
would cause trouble under the Washington law of guardianship. For
in Washington a guardian may not use guardianship funds for the
support or education of a child if the parents can make adequate
provision. This seems to have been the same restraint laid down by
the trust provisions in the Fondren case which prompted the Court to
declare it a gift of a future interest.
Under the laws of Washington guardianship the restraint on sale-
dependent on the discretion of both the guardian and then the Court-
the restraint on contract, and the restraint on use of funds for the
minor are certainly, under the gift tax law, not only a postponement,
however momentary, but also in many cases a complete denial to the
child of the right of enjoyment of the property during minority.
Nice legal points can be made to distinguish a legal guardianship
from a trust principally on the basis that in the former the property
has really passed to the minor but the law protects the estate from
his indiscretion, while in the latter, the property has not actually passed
to the minor, but certain rights have been suspended in the trustee.
Such reasoning begs the question. In both cases the guardian or bona
fide trustees are intended to be mere custodians for the benefit of the
minor. As a practical matter, under almost every trust the minor bene-
ficiary receives more benefits, rights and enjoyment from, the trust
property during minority than under a legal guardianship. Yet oddly
enough, under a more generous type of trust where a trustee may give
income and principal, our courts have recently denied any exclusion."3
Whereas, if only income is allowed, exclusion is permitted in part; but
in a guardianship where neither principal nor income may, in many
cases be used for the minor's benefit, the full exclusion is granted! It
is submitted that any real distinction is nonexistent. It is hoped that
52 Efforts are being made by the American Bar Association Committee on Federal
estate and gift taxes to amend the gift tax exclusion provision so that it will except
from the future interest definition any gifts to minor beneficiaries.
53 See Kniep v. Commissioner, supra.
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the U. S. Supreme Court will rule on the problem, but perhaps it is
wiser to hope that Congress and the Washington State Legislature
will amend the law applying the gift tax exclusion to gifts in trust for
minor children.
Pending favorable action by Congress and the Legislature or by the
Supreme Court, the gift-minded antecedents of minor children had
best employ the accepted form of trust and pay the tax or make their
gifts to a legal guardian. The Kieckhefer trust is "neither fish nor
fowl." It is a trust only so long as the legal guardian chooses not to
exercise his right to the trust estate. It is transformed into a legal
guardianship with all its encumbrances and limitations, once this right
is exercised. The time tested advantages of a trust over a guardianship
still remain worthy of serious consideration by the provident persons
who desire to establish estates for their minor progeny and who wish
to afford the most workable form of protection for both estate and
minor. It seems unfortunate to cast out the trust form in those cases
where to do so will avoid only a slight tax liability. Yet, on the other
hand, perhaps the inconveniences and minor expenses of legal guardi-
anships are easier to endure than the constant hammering of the in-
come, death and gift tax collectors against the generous donor!
